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Abstract
We present an exact modeling of cut-free arithmetic by cut-free predicate logic. Exact proof-
theoretic analysis reveals connections with omega-consistency and reection. c© 2000 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Both automated and interactive proof-search in rst- and higher-order arithmetic
needs interface to the existing well-developed proof engines for rst-order logic and
rst-order arithmetic. In the presence of higher-order quantiers arithmetic can be re-
duced to logic via a famous denition of the set N as the intersection of all sets
containing 0 and closed under successor:
N = fx: 8X (X 0&8y(Xy!X (y + 1))!Xx)g:
This transformation and its analogs like transitive closure provide most of the non-
trivial examples for proof-search in type-theoretic languages. Several of the known
strategies for higher-order proof-search can be traced to strategies for arithmetic. There
is a simple translation of higher-order language into (many sorted and then into one-
sorted) rst-order language, but it obliterates too many important distinctions and makes
usual rst-order strategies practically useless. We propose a strategy of a proof search in
cut-free logic which allows an exact modeling of cut-free arithmetic. It is presented here
in detail for the rst-order case, but admits a smooth extension to the higher-order case.
Technically this goes back to [4] where the second author gave a normal form theorem
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for logical derivations nitistically implying one for arithmetic. This theorem is in fact
equivalent to the 2-consistency of PA. Ikeda [1] gave a proof-theoretic demonstration of
a normal form theorem for arithmetic derivations nitistically implying !-consistency.
Soon after the rst author noticed a possibility to extend it to derivations in an arbitrary
theory in the manner of [4]. First, we present here a short proof of these results which
extends the proof in [4]. Second, we prove this normal form theorem by a transnite
induction. From this proof we can conclude that the normal form theorem for recursive
theories is equivalent to the 2-consistency of an iterated reection theory over PA.
2. Irreducible derivations
Consider a standard cut-free formulation of classical predicate logic where each
rule except contraction has at most one side (= auxiliary) formula in each premise
(= upper sequent).
Axioms: A;   ‘ ; A
A;   ‘ 
  ‘ ; A!B ‘!
  ‘ ; B
  ‘ ; A!B
  ‘ ; A B;   ‘ 
A!B;   ‘  !‘
: ‘   ‘ ; A:A;   ‘  ‘ :
A;   ‘ 
  ‘ ;:A
8 ‘ A[t];   ‘ 8xA;   ‘  ‘ 8
  ‘ ; A[b]
  ‘ ; 8xA
9 ‘ A[b];   ‘ 9xA;   ‘  ‘ 9
  ‘ ; A[t]
  ‘ ; 9xA
plus contraction and (implicit) permutation rule.
Logical connectives other than !;:; 8; 9 are introduced in a standard way as abbre-
viations.
Denition 1. An inference (i.e. application of a rule) L is redundant with respect to
a set A of formulas i an antecedent side formula of L or a negation of a succedent
side formula of L is implied by A in the predicate logic.
For example, the rst of the rules ‘! above is redundant if A ‘ A, and the second
of them is redundant if A ‘ :B.
In this paper, we assume that the language is countable and contains an individual
constant.
Denition 2. d is a derivation with proper variables if a variable b can occur free in the
premise of an inference L but not below only in the case, when b is the eigenvariable
of L.
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Note that free variables of such a derivation are eigenvariables and free variables of
its last sequent. The following statement is an easy consequence of Theorem 1 in [4]
and will follow from Theorem 2 below.
Theorem 1. Every sequent provable in rst-order logic has a cut-free derivation with
proper variables containing no inferences redundant with respect to ;.
Let A0; : : : ;An+1 be sets of closed formulas. By a derivation of A0; : : : ;An;   ‘
 we mean a derivation of a sequent A00; : : : ;A
0
n;   ‘ for some nite subsets
A0i Ai (i6n). We say that a formula is traceable to Ai+1 if the formula is an
ancestor of a formula in Ai+1 in the sense of [6]. The ancestor relation is dened as
the reexive transitive closure of the immediate ancestor relation between the occur-
rences of formulas in the premise and conclusion of some rule. Formulas in  ;  of a
premise are immediate ancestors of corresponding formulas in  ;  of the conclusion.
Side formulas A; B of propositional rules (they occur in premises) are immediate an-
cestors of the main formula of the same rule (i.e. of A!B or :A), and side formulas
A[t]; A[b] of quantier rules are immediate ancestors of main formulas 8xA; 9xA.
Denition 3. An inference L in a derivation of a sequent
A0; : : : ;An ‘An+1 (1)
is n-redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;An if for some i; 06i6n, the main formula
of L is traceable to Ai+1 and L is redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;Ai. A derivation
of sequent (1) is irreducible with respect to A0; : : : ;An if it is cut-free with proper
variables and contains no inferences n-redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;An.
Then our extended normal form theorem is stated as follows:
Theorem 2. Every sequent (1) provable in rst-order logic has an irreducible deriva-
tion with respect to A0; : : : ;An.
A proof is presented in Section 4.
3. Applications
Before presenting a proof of Theorem 2 in Section 4, note the following:
Corollary 1 (After Ikeda [1]). Theorem 2 nitistically implies !-consistency of PA.
Proof. Let B0 consist of closures of all axioms of PA dierent from induction, B1
consist of all closures of induction axioms
8x(B[0]&8y(B[y]! B[y + 1])! B[x]): (2)
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The exact denition of the set B0 is irrelevant here. We only require that (1) B0
consists solely of purely universal sentences, and (2) B0 proves every true 1 sentence.
Assume that 9xA[x] is a sentence derivable in PA. By Theorem 2 there is a logical
derivation of the sequent
B0;B1 ‘ 9xA[x] (3)
with proper variables containing no redundant inferences. Consider inferences in such
a derivation beginning from the very last one deriving sequent (3). Since all closed
instances of the formulas in B1 are logically derivable from B0, none of the formulas
in (2) is analysed before some eigenvariable appears. None of the inferences analysing
formulas in B0 introduces eigenvariables, since the only quantiers these formulas




1 ‘ ; A[t]
B00;B
0
1 ‘ ; 9xA[x]
‘ 9
dB0;B1 ‘ 9xA[x]
where d consists of inferences traceable to B0 and structural inferences, and t is a
constant term. If m is the value of t, then :A[ m] is not derivable in PA (i.e. from
B0; B1) since otherwise the inference ‘ 9 would be redundant.
Note 1. The obvious observation that all closed instances of induction axioms (2)
are logically derivable from B0 is crucial here. Theorems 1 and 2 are non-eective
since the notion of a redundant inference (Denition 1) is non-recursive. Eective
versions of these theorems still sucient for applications above and in [4] are obtained
by restricting Denitions 1 and 2 to recursive subsets. For example, it is enough to
consider a rule L to be redundant if it is 8-antecedent analysing the universal closure
of (2) and substituting a constant term for x (cf. [4], the end of Section 3).
For a theory A in the language of PA, let RFN (A) denote the reection schema
for A:
RFN (A): 8d[ProvA (d; end(d))& end(d) 2 n ! Trn(end(d))] (n 2 !);
where
1. n denotes the set of codes of n sentences,
2. ProvA(d; x) denotes a standard proof predicate for A expressing that d is a deriva-
tion of the formula x in A,
3. end(d) denotes the end formula of the derivation d, and
4. Trn denotes the partial truth denition for n sentences.
Note that our formulation of RFN (A) is equivalent to the formulation in [5] via
Proposition 2. From the observation above and a cut elimination we infer the following
statement (cf. [3]):
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Proposition 1. Over PRA induction schema (2) is equivalent to RFN (B0).
Let qf − ind denote the induction axioms (2) for primitive recursive formulas B,
i.e., B0 + qf − ind = PRA.
Let Cn denote the theory inductively dened as follows:
1. Let C0 =B0 consist of closures of all axioms of PA dierent from induction as
above.
2. Cn+1 = qf − ind+ Cn + RFN (Cn).
For example C1 =PA.
Recall that k-consistency of an arithmetical system is its !-consistency for k -
sentences. The second application of Theorem 2 is the following
Corollary 2. For every n Theorem 2 nitistically implies 2-consistency of Cn+1.
Proof. Assume that 9xA[x] is a 2 sentence derivable in Cn+1, but 9xA[x] is false.
By Theorem 2 there is a logical derivation of the sequent
C0;C1; : : : ;Cn;Cn+1 ‘ 9xA[x] (4)
with proper variables containing no redundant inferences. Consider inferences in such
a derivation beginning from the very last one deriving the sequent (4). None of the
inferences analysing formulas in C0 introduces eigenvariables, since the only quantiers
these formulas contain are initial 8-quantiers. Since C0 is consistent, there must be
an inference analysing a formula B in C1; : : : ;Cn;Cn+1; 9xA[x]. Consider the lowermost
such inference.
Case 1: The analysed formula B is 9xA[x] in the succedent: The side formula is a
false 1 sentence of the form A[t] for some constant term t. Then the true 1-sentence
:A[t] would be derivable from C0 and a fortiori from C0; : : : ;Cn so that the inference
would be redundant.
Case 2: B is an induction axiom (2) traceable to Ci+1 (06i6n) in the antecedent.
As in the proof of Corollary 1 we see that this is impossible.
Case 3: B is a reection formula traceable to Ci+1 (06i6n) in the antecedent. The
side formula is of the form:
ProvCi( d; end( d)) & end( d)2n! Trn(end( d)) for some constant term d. This in-
ference is not redundant. Hence, the quantier-free formula ProvCi( d; end( d)) & end( d)
2n is true by the 1 completeness of C0. Let C denote the sentence whose code is
end(d). Then C is derivable in Ci (with the derivation of the code d) and so is the
side formula. This contradicts the normality of the derivation.
Here, we used the following observation concerning a recursive 1-complete
theory A.
Proposition 2 (cf. Smorynski [5, Lemma 4.1.6]).
PRA ‘ PrA(\ProvA( _y; \B(_x)")!B(_x)"):
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Here PrA denotes a standard provability predicate for A and \B" stands for the
godel number of a formula B.
Let !− CONGA denote the global !-consistency:
!− CONGA : 8B[PrA(\9xB(x)")!9x:PrA(\:B(_x)")]:
and k − CONA, the k-consistency:
k − CONA 8B2k−1[PRA(\9xB(x)")!9x:PrA(\:B(_x)")]:
Proposition 2 implies the following statement (cf. in [5, Theorem 4.2.5]).
Proposition 3. (1) PRA ‘ !− CONGA$RFN2 (A+ RFN (A))
(2) PRA ‘ k − CONA$RFN2 (A+ RFNk (A)) for k>2.
This is included in Theorem 4.2.5 in [5]. We sketch a proof since it is omitted in
[5].
Proof. We prove the proposition for k − CONA (k>2).
Put A0=A+ RFNk (A).
[ ] It suces to show that
PRA ‘ 8d(8B2k−1)PrA0(\ProvA( _d; \9xB")!9x:PrA(\:B(_x)")");
since ProvA(d; \9xB")!9x:PrA(\:B(_x)")22. First by Proposition 2 with
AA0, we have PrA0(\ProvA( _d; \9xB")!9xB"). On the other hand, we have
PRA0(\8xPrA(:B(_x))!8x:B") by :B2k−1 and RFNk (A). We are done.
[!] Let R denote a k−1 formula such that
RFNk (A)$8x8y8B2k−1[ProvA(x; \B( _y)")! Trk−1 (\B( _y)")]
$8zR(z):
Assume PrA0(\9xC") with C 21. Then PrA(\9z9x(R(z) ! C)") and 9z9x(R(z)
!C)2k . By k − CONA we have 9z9x:PrA(\R( _z)&:C(_x)"). By 1 completeness
we have :C(x)!PrA(\:C(_x)"). Also by Proposition 2 we have PrA(\R( _z)"). From
these we conclude 9xC.
In particular, !−CONGPA is equivalent to RFN2 (C1+RFN (C1)), i.e., to 2-consistency
of C2.
Therefore Corollary 1 is included in Corollary 2.
3.1. Non-eectiveness of !-consistency
From Corollary 1 it may appear that a witness function w for the !-consistency is
recursive. But this is wrong.
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Proposition 4. Let A be a recursive 1 complete theory. For any k with 26k6!;
there is no partial recursive function f majorizing the witness function w(d) for the
k-consistency of A :
1. d2dom(f) for any derivation d in A ending with a k sentence 9xB and
2. A ‘= :B( m) for some m6f(d) for such a d.
Corollary 3. The same holds for the function w1(9xB) ’ m(A ‘= :B(m)) if A ‘ 9xB
and 9xB2k and for the function t : d 7! t(d) which transforms a derivation d to
an irreducible derivation with the same end sequent.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that such an f exists and A is k-consistent. Note
that RFN3 (T )=RFN2 (T ). Let C denote a 2 sentence expressing the specication
of f stated in the proposition. Then A+C ‘ k−CONA and hence A+RFNk +C ‘
RFN3 (A+RFNk (A)) by Proposition 3. This contradicts the Kreisel{Levy Essential
Unboundedness theorem (cf. [3] or [5, Lemma 4.1.13]):
For every 3-sentence C;A0 + C ‘= RFN3 (A0) unless A0 + C is inconsistent.
4. A proof of Theorem 2 by a refutation method
In this section we present a proof of Theorem 2 due to the second author. The proof
is based on a refutation method as in the model theoretic proof in [4].
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that sequent (1) (to be denoted by S) does not have
a derivation satisfying our conditions. Consider its canonical proof search tree TS
respecting proper variable and irredundancy restrictions. Recall that such a tree is
constructed by bottom up applications of logical rules which can derive the given
sequent (cf. [2, Section 49], or [6]). Every formula actually present in the tree and every
formula from A0; : : : ;An should be eventually analysed with all possible side formulas.
If B0; : : : ; Bi; : : : is an enumeration of the set A0; : : : ;An, then one adds formula Bi at
the 2ith step and analyses logical connectives at the odd-numbered steps. We substitute
in the 8 ‘- and ‘ 9-inferences only terms containing proper variables, and we do not
include n-redundant inferences. If for example an antecedent formula A&B is traceable
to Ai+1 and
A0; : : : ;Ai ‘ A is derivable; (5)
then A is not added to the antecedent.
As in the usual model-theoretic proof of the cut-elimination theorem, TS cannot
be closed (i.e. it is impossible that all branches end in axioms), since then it is a
derivation satisfying our conditions. Hence, it is possible to nd (by Konig’s lemma)
a non-closed branch W of TS. Let us verify that it determines a countermodel for S
with the universe U of all terms occurring in W . Denote by Wa ; Wc the antecedent
and succedent of W , i.e. the set of all formulas occurring in these parts of W . They
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satisfy the following properties, very similar to those used in the usual model{theoretic
proof of the admissibility of cut. Here a formula F is called redundant w.r.t. Wa (Wc)
and a formula G 2Wa (resp. G 2Wc) if G is traceable to Ai+1 and A0; : : : ;Ai ‘ F is
derivable (resp. A0; : : : ;Ai ‘ :F is derivable).
(a) Wa ; Wc are disjoint w.r.t. atomic formulas.
(:) If :F 2Wa (2Wc) then either (:F is redundant w.r.t. Wa and :F) or F 2Wc
(resp. :F is redundant w.r.t. Wc and :F , or F 2Wa).
In the next clauses we say simply ‘redundant’ instead of ‘redundant w.r.t. the suitable
main formula’.
(&) If (A&B)2Wa ((A&B)2Wc) then each of the formulas A, B is redundant or
belongs to Wa (resp. at least one of the formulas A, B is redundant or belongs to Wc).
(‘ 8) If 8xB[x]2Wc then B[t] for some t is redundant or belongs to Wc.
(8 ‘) If 8xB[x]2Wa then for every t 2U; B[t] is redundant or belongs to Wa and
similar clauses for existence.
Denote by  the unique model with domain U given by the condition:
(E)= 1 i E 2Wa (6)
for atomic formulas E. To prove that (S)= 0 one proves
(C 2Wa ! (C)= 1) & (C 2Wc ! (C)= 0) (7)
by induction on (i; C) where C is traceable to Ai. In fact, most part of the induction
requires only (complexity of) C as in the standard proof. Induction base is (a) above,
and induction step uses properties :;&;‘ 8 ‘;‘ 9 ‘ in a standard way. However, the
case of a redundant side formula requires special care. Suppose, for example, that A is
not added to the antecedent for an antecedent formula A&B, since the latter is traceable
to Ai+1 and (5) holds. Then, by the induction hypothesis on i, we have
(A0; : : : ;Ai)= 1
and hence by (5) (A)= 1. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
5. A proof of Theorem 2 by a transnite induction
In this section we prove the extended normal form theorem, Theorem 2 by a trans-
nite induction up to the nth epsilon number n. From this proof we conclude that
Theorem 2 for recursive theories A0; : : : ;An is equivalent to the 2-consistency
RFN2 (Cn+1) of the theory Cn+1 over the Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA.
Theorem 3.
PRA ‘ RFN2 (Cn+1)$ Theorem 2 for recursive A0; : : : ;An:
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The direction Theorem 2 )RFN2 (Cn+1) follows from Corollary 2 since PRA ‘
CON (C0). For the other direction we prove Theorem 2 by using an transnite induction
up to the nth epsilon number n in the following way:
Let < denote a standard well ordering of type !. Let
Prg[A0],df 8(8<A0()!A0()).
We dene below a primitive recursive (in A0; : : : ;An) function o(d)<n (the ordinal
assigned to a derivation D) so that
PRA ‘ Prg[A0]
for the following 3 formula A0():
8derivation D[o(D) = !9irreducible E(end(D)= end(E))]:
Observe here that ‘a derivation E is irreducible’ is 1.
Lemma 1. For every arithmetical formula A
PRA ‘ 8<nPrCn+1(\Prg[A]!A( _)"):
Proof. By induction on n<!. The case n = 0 is well known since C1 = PA. For
the induction step use the following proposition which has established similarly to the
case n = 0:
Proposition 5. For every arithmetical formula A
PRA ‘ 8<n+1PrPA+TIn (\Prg[A]!A( _)"):
Here TIn denote the schema of transnite induction up to n applied to any formula
in the language of PA.
Assume PRA ‘ Prg[A0] and a fortiori Cn+1 ‘ Prg[A0]. Then from the above lemma
and A0 23 we conclude
RFN3 (Cn+1) ‘ 8<nA0(); i:e:;
RFN3 (Cn+1) ‘ 8derivation D9irreducible E(end(D) = end(E));
since o(D)<n for any derivation D.
This yields the other direction of Theorem 3.
In what follows, we give a sketchy proof of Prg[A0] with the above 3 formula A0
and a denition of the ordinal assignment o(D).
Fix n and nite sets of closed formulas A0; : : : ;An.
A sequence f i ‘ i: i6n+ 1g of sequents is said to be a partitioned sequent.
We write the partitioned sequent
f i ‘ i: i6n+ 1g in the form
 0; : : : ;  n+1 ‘ 0; : : : ; n+1: (8)
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We say that a partitioned sequent (8) is derivable from A0; : : : ;An if the sequent
A0; : : : ;An;  0; : : : ;  n+1 ‘ 0; : : : ; n+1 (9)
is derivable in the predicate logic. A derivation of sequent (9) is said to be a derivation
of the partitioned sequent (8) from A0; : : : ;An.
An inference L in a derivation of the partitioned sequent (8) from A0; : : : ;An is
redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;An if for some i; 06i6n, the main formula of
L is traceable to Ai+1 [ i+1 [i+1 and L is redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;Ai.
A derivation of the partitioned sequent (8) from A0; : : : ;An is irreducible with respect
to A0; : : : ;An if it is cut-free with proper variables containing no inferences redun-
dant with respect to A0; : : : ;An. Otherwise the derivation is reducible with respect to
A0; : : : ;An. We prove a slightly stronger version of Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Every partitioned sequent (8) derivable from A0; : : : ;An has an irre-
ducible derivation from A0; : : : ;An.
Our proof of this theorem is an easy adaptation from Gentzen [6] and Ikeda [1].
Let D be a derivation of a sequent (9).
An inference L in the derivation D is i-explicit if the main formula of L is traceable
to Ai [ i [i. L is said to be implicit if it is not i-explicit for any i.
The degree d(A) of a formula A is the number of occurrences of logical connectives
in A. The degree d(L) of an inference L is dened as follows:
1: d(L)= maxfd(A): A is a side formula of Lg if L is a logical inference,
2: d(L)= the degree of the cut formula of L if L is a cut,
3: d(L)= 0 otherwise.
For a sequent S in the derivation D the height h(S) of S in D is dened as follows:
1: h(S) = 0 if S is the endsequent of D,
2: h(S) = maxfh(S 0); d(L)g if S is an upper sequent of an inference L whose lower
sequent is S 0.
Let ] denote the natural sum of the ordinals ; . Put
−1 =df !
and
30() = ; 3h+1() = 33h():
To each sequent S and each inference L in the derivation D, we assign ordinals
o(S); o(L)<n as follows:
1. o(S) = 1 for an initial sequent S.
2. Assume that S is the lower sequent of an inference L with the upper sequents
Sj (j<k; k = 1; 2). If o(Sj) have been assigned to Sj, we determine o(L) and o(S)
as follows:
(a) o(L)= o(S0)]o(S1) if L is a cut.
(b) o(L)= ]fo(Sj): j<kg]i−2 if L is i-explicit with 16i6n+ 1.
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(c) o(L)= ]fo(Sj): j<kg]1 if L is either 0-explicit or implicit.
(d) o(L)= o(S0) otherwise.
(e) o(S) = 3h(o(L)) with h = h(Sj)− h(S).
3: o(D)= o(S) for the endsequent S of D.
Note that the assigned ordinal is unchanged if we substitute an individual constant
for a free variable other than the eigenvariables. We have
Lemma 2. Let D be a reducible derivation of sequent (9) with proper variables. Then
there exist derivations Dj (j<k; k = 1; 2) such that o(Dj)<o(D) and if the endse-
quents of Dj; j<k have irreducible derivations; then so does endsequent (9) of D.
Proof. Consider the case when there exists an i-explicit inference L such that there is
no logical inference below L. For example assume L is a ‘ ! of the following form:
A;   ‘ 
  ‘ ; A!B ‘ !
The main formula A!B of L is traceable to i.
Case 1: Either i = 0 or L is not redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;Ai−1: Then delete
the inference L to obtain a derivation D0 of the sequent
A0; : : : ;An;  0; : : : ;  i; A; : : : ;  n+1 ‘ 0; : : : ; n+1
Clearly o(D0)<o(D).
Case 2: L is redundant with respect to A0; : : : ;Ai−1 and i 6=0: Then A is derivable
from A0; : : : ;Ai−1. Pick a cut-free derivation E of the sequent A0; : : : ;Ai−1 ‘ A with
proper variables. Replace the inference L by a cut and weakening to obtain a derivation
D0 of the same endsequent:
A0; : : : ;Ai−1 ‘ A A;   ‘ 
A0; : : : ;Ai−1;   ‘ ; A!B
Let S0 denote the left premise A0; : : : ;Ai−1 ‘ A A!B of the cut and S1 the right
premise A;   ‘ . It suces to show the following Claim to have o(D0)<o(D).
Claim. o(S0)<i−2 and o(S1;D0)6o(S1;D).
Proof. First consider the ordinal o(S0). Let K be a logical inference in E. If the main
formula of K is traceable to the cut formula A, then K is implicit in D0 and hence we
add 1 at the inference K . Otherwise the main formula of K is traceable to an Ak ; k<i;
i.e., K is k-explicit in E and in D0. At K we add k−2 if k 6=0 or 1 otherwise. Since
we have <i−2) 3<i−2; we get o(S0)<i−2.
Next, consider the ordinal o(S1;D0) assigned to the sequent S1 in D0. Let M denote
a logical inference in the upper part of S1. If the main formula of M is traceable to
the side formula A of L, then M is implicit in D0 and i-explicit in the original D. At
M we add 1 in D0 and i−2 in D. Therefore, we conclude o(S1;D0)6o(S1;D).
From this lemma we see Prg[A0] and hence Theorem 3.
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6. Conclusion
Theorems 1 and 2, especially the recursive version mentioned in Note 1 (Section 3)
provide a strategy for the bottom-up proof-search from goal to subgoal: apply only
inferences which lead to irreducible derivations. This strategy is extremely powerful
in the logical sense: for example, it gives rst-order logic the full power of induc-
tion. It is obviously compatible with some of the known strategies, say with inversion
strategy which forces an immediate analysis of propositional connectives and positive
quantiers. Compatibility with other strategies is one of the directions of further work.
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